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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, state-chartered for-profit and nonprofit 
organizations have existed as two distinct sectors, each one with unique 
purposes—shareholder profit and societal mission. Today, various state 
legislatures, as “laboratories of democracy,”2 have created Benefit 
Corporations, L3Cs and other forms of social enterprise through 
“stakeholder statutes.” 3 These statutes specifically allow social 
enterprise to blend the shareholder for-profit objective and the nonprofit 
public purpose mission. Furthermore, these stakeholder statutes explicitly
allow and encourage Director consideration of non-shareholder 
interests.4 This explicit consideration of stakeholders differs from 
traditional for-profit Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 
philanthropy, and shared value where the public purpose is voluntary. 
Shared value, as heralded by Michael Porter, is a “new view of
capitalism,” which emphasizes innovation, creativity, core competencies,
and sustainability to advance both business and social objectives and 
thereby ethically seek profits.5 Social enterprise reinforces this shared 
value approach, but does so through blending the entity’s dual expressed 
objectives of social mission and profits; therefore, social enterprise 
                                                          
2 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 386-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave 
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious 
consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country. Id.
3 These are commonly referred to as “constituency” or “non-shareholder” 
statutes. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable 
Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 453(2011); See also Jaclyn 
Cherry, Charitable Organizations and Commercial Activity: A New Era - Will 
the Social Entrepreneurship Movement Force Change?, 5/2 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP L. 345, 346-371 (2012); see also Ashley Schoenjahn, New 
Faces of Corporate Responsibility: Will New Entity Forms Allow Businesses to 
Do Good?, 37/2 J. CORP. L. 591(2012).
4 See Lisa .M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Re-assessing the Score of 
Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-
Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV., 409, 436, 449-51 (2002);
L.N. Mulligan, What’s Good of the Goose Is Not Good For the Gander: 
Sarbanes-Oxley-style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 2004-07
(2007).
5 See Porter, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
2
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requires shared value. By promoting the dynamism of social enterprise, 
states are expanding their historic oversight of the corporate entity and 
requiring new forms of governance that reaffirms public purpose.6
Consequently, the state-created social enterprise requires a shift in 
corporate governance values and fiduciary obligations.7
The governance consequences for social enterprise, what some 
call a “new sector” of the economy, are unclear.8  They place the 
fundamental ethical values of corporate governance at a crossroads and 
require new policies to balance the blended objectives and fiduciary 
duties of shareholder for-profit objectives and nonprofit social mission.9
This article reviews social enterprise within the context of the blended 
objectives and fiduciary duties of Benefit Corporations (B-Corps) and 
L3Cs. It examines for-profits and their separate corporate philanthropic 
nonprofit foundations. In doing so, the authors not only recognize the 
conflicting fiduciary duty and implications as current literature 
articulates, but are also requiring that a new fiduciary stand should be 
established. Perhaps, through sector blurring, a shared value fiduciary 
duty has already evolved within the traditional two sectors, which finds 
more clear expression as social enterprise. 
The authors propose five recommendations to enhance the 
governance framework of social enterprise and to empower social 
entrepreneurs in their quest to balance the governance of both social 
mission and profits: 1) designate L3Cs as qualified Program Related 
Investments (PRI) recipients; 2) require state Attorney General oversight 
of social enterprise; 3) reduce state statutory ambiguities; 4) adopt 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)-like ethical principles of transparency, 
disclosure and accountability; and 5) establish and clarify fiduciary duty 
as shared value for both a corporate governance and legislative standard. 
Social enterprise, the burgeoning potential fourth sector of the economy, 
demands balanced governance values now. 
                                                          
6 Bill Gates, Address at Harvard Commencement (June 7, 2007), available at
https://perma.cc/96KR-469S.
7 Heerad Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, 89/11 HARVARD BUS. REV. 98 
(2011).
8 Id. and accompanying text.
9 John A. Pearce II & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Regulation of L3Cs for Social 
Entrepreneurship:  A Prerequisite to Increased Utilization, 92 NEB. L. REV.
259, 270 (2013).
3
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II. CORPORATE FORM
The public purpose of a corporate form enjoys a long history. 
Early in the nineteenth century, the court in Dartmouth first reaffirmed 
the requirement that business corporations serve a public purpose,
although it recognized them as private since their assets came from 
private sources.10 In the mid-nineteenth century, collaboration between 
private corporations and the public sector occurred as states used 
corporate business charters to raise revenue from public services.11
Thus, this state-created corporate form, while making a profit, 
contributed to societal good by facilitating the construction of canals, 
roads and bridges, and later engaged in banking, insurance, and 
manufacturing.12 As demand for corporate charters increased, state 
legislatures passed corporation statutes requiring new governance 
standards.13
Business corporations continued, yet their public purpose was 
subordinated to profits, and public purpose eventually died out; thus, 
nonprofits remained the sole guardian of public purpose.14 The nation 
entered an unregulated era of the “robber barons.”15 During this period,
a fiduciary concept evolved. Its purpose was not to preclude public 
purpose; rather, its purpose was to prevent Directors and Officers from 
engaging in conflicts of interests, such as self-dealing. This fiduciary 
obligation set a moral tone of ethical and financial accountability, 
perhaps as an attempt to reestablish the “sacred trust” in corporate 
governance, a value originally articulated by Leonard Bacon.16
                                                          
10 See Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,
50 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 51, 65 (1993).
11 DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM: GUIDE TO A RADICAL 
CAPITALISM 450-51 (1st ed. 1973); PETER D. HALL, A HISTORY OF NONPROFIT 
BOARDS IN THE UNITED STATES, BOARDSOURCE E-BOOK SERIES (2003), 
available at https://perma.cc/CR4D-57HG.
12 See Maier, supra note 10, at 52-53.
13 Id.
14 Id.; James Surowiecki, Companies With Benefits, NEW YORKER, Aug. 4, 2014, 
available at https://perma.cc/XCH7-EMAJ.
15 A robber baron is “an American capitalist of the latter part of the 19th century 
who became wealthy through exploitation (as of natural resources, governmental 
influence, or low wage scales).” “robber baron.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
available at https://perma.cc/9X9V-K475.
16 Leonard Bacon, Responsibility in the Management of Societies, 5 THE NEW 
ENGLANDER 28, 29, 32, 33 (1847). Bacon set the ethical and moral tone for 
nonprofit associations to receive continued public support, noting that nonprofit 
4
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol16/iss2/1
Spring]                                      Shared Value                                      309
These developments opened the door to a new governance 
standard: the Dodge shareholder primacy doctrine. It stated that “[a]
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit 
of the stockholders” and that the “discretion of the directors…does not 
extend…to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of profits 
among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”17 This 
doctrine established a corporate governance norm that is commonly 
referred to as “profit maximization” and was strengthened by Milton 
Friedman in the mid-twentieth century. It asserts that maximizing 
shareholder wealth is the business corporation’s central objective since 
“a corporation’s only social responsibility is to maximize profits for its 
shareholders…without deception or fraud.”18 As “profit maximization”
solidified, business corporations dismissed early CSR initiatives as 
diverging from profit maximization.19 The nonprofit form became the 
guardian on public purpose mission. However, the subsequent 
stakeholder theory of Edward Freeman in the 1980’s reclaimed historic 
American capitalism rooted in a public purpose that has sustained CSR.20
                                                                                                                                  
governance must reflect trust in a higher sense of ethics and morality to assure 
public support “as a security against mismanagement and gradual perversion of 
the trust.” Mark S. Blodgett, Linda J. Melconian & Jason H. Peterson, 7 
Evolving Corporate Governance Standards for Healthcare Nonprofits: Is Board 
of Director Compensation a Breach of Fiduciary Duty? Brooklyn J. Corp. Fin. 
Comm. L. 443, 443 (2013). Yale professor, Leonard Bacon, studied nonprofit 
governance and published an article on fiduciary accountability to the public. He 
asserted that Board members, as fiduciaries, are accountable to a higher power 
of morality and that they must disclose their activities. This fiduciary 
responsibility was thus also an individual responsibility as the manager of 
others’ property. This high standard of fiduciary accountability was necessary to 
prevent public hostility.
Id. at 443 n.1.
17 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 170 N.W. 668, 684-85 (Mich. 1919).
18 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
Profits, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970 at 17 (quoting MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (University of Chicago Press) 
(2002)).
19 Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate 
Social Responsibility:  A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice, INT’L J.
MGMT. REV., Dec. 1, 2010, at 85.
20 See e.g., Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory:  Some Future 
Directors, 4  BUS. ETHICS Q., 1994, at 409, (arguing that a corporation owes a 
fiduciary duty to not just its owners but to other parties, including the 
community, customers, and employees).. Henry Mintzberg, Robert Simons & 
Kuna Basu, Beyond Selfishness, 44 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. at 67, 69 (Fall 
5
Blodgett et al.: Social Enterprise: Raffirming Public Purpose Governance Through S
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
                    Journal of Business & Securities Law         [Vol. 16310
Today, business corporations commonly recognize CSR and 
view stakeholders as existing beyond shareholders to the extent that 
some expressly attribute a fiduciary duty to the stakeholder community at 
large.21 The flexibility of the Business Judgment Rule has allowed 
Directors to consider other stakeholders and engage in CSR without 
express authority under corporate law.22 Furthermore, CSR encompasses 
both philanthropic initiatives and the business case or strategy, such as 
“making profits while doing good.”23 The CSR of business strategy is 
further refined by the innovation and sustainability of shared value.24
                                                                                                                                  
2002)(“Corporations used to exist, or so we once believed, to serve society. 
Indeed, that was the reason they were originally granted charters – and why 
those charters could be revoked. Corporations are economic entities, to be sure, 
but they are also social institutions that must justify their existence by their 
overall contribution to society.  Specifically, they must serve a balanced set of 
stakeholders.  That, at least, was the prevalent view until perhaps ten years ago.  
Now, one group of these stakeholders – the shareholders – has muscled out all 
the others.”).
21 See e.g.,  Bradley R. Agle, Thomas Donaldson, R. Edward Freeman, Michael 
C. Jensen, Ronald K. Mitchell & Donna J. Wood, Dialogue:  Towards Superior 
Stakeholder Theory, BUS. ETHICS Q., April 2008, at 153; Susan C. Atherton, 
Charles A. Atherton & Mark S. Blodgett, Fiduciary Principles: Corporate 
Responsibilities to Stakeholders,” 2 J. RELIGION & BUS. ETHICS 1 (2011). 
22 See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187-88 (Del. 1988). The Business 
Judgment Rule is a rule designed by courts to protect directors of a corporation. 
Id. According to the Rule, a court will assume that directors acted in the 
corporation’s best interest, unless plaintiffs can prove that the Rule should not 
apply, by alleging the following: that the directors did not act in good faith, in 
the best interests of the corporation, on an uninformed basis, and that they were 
wasteful and acting in their own self-interest.  Id. If plaintiffs can prove this, the 
court will set aside the Business Judgment Rule and require the directors to 
show that they acted in good faith.  Id.
23 Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate 
Social Responsibility:  A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice, 12 INT’L
J. MGMT. REV. 85, (2010). Michael E. Porter, Mark R. Kramer, The Link 
Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV.
BUS. REV. 78, (2006)(“If, instead, corporations were to analyze their prospects 
for social responsibility using the same frameworks that guide their core 
business choices, they would discover that CSR can be much more than a cost, a 
constraint, or a charitable deed – it can be a source of opportunity, innovation, 
and competitive advantage.”) 
24 See Porter, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying 
text; Michael E. Porter & Mark R Kramer, The Big Idea:  Creating Shared 
Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 62-77 (“Regulation that discourages 
shared value looks very different. It forces compliance with particular practices, 
6
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Recent federal statutes, such as the Sarbanes Oxley and the 
Dodd-Frank Acts, have strived to shore up traditional corporate fiduciary 
duties in the midst of corporate irregularities and malfeasance.25
Additionally, in response to a number of nonprofit scandals, Congress 
initiated a governance study of the nonprofit sector. Its purpose was to 
galvanize ethical nonprofit leadership to enhance the values of 
accountability, disclosure and transparency, which support the fiduciary 
duty to nonprofit mission.26 Moreover, current CSR business strategy, 
                                                                                                                                  
rather than focusing on measurable social improvement.”); See also Jed 
Emerson & Sheila Bonini, Maximizing Blended Value-Building Beyond the 
Blended Value Map to Sustainable Investing, Philanthropy and Organizations,
Jan. 2005, at 4, available at https://perma.cc/C4MH-R5ZE. It is clear, however, 
that nonprofit organizations create economic value and for-profit companies 
have social impact and worth. Consider, for example, the economic value of 170 
million boxes of Girl Scout cookies sales or the social impact of Wal-Mart 
providing employment for 1.4 million people. While not the primary purpose of 
these organizations, a growing group of practitioners, investors and 
philanthropists are advancing strategies that intentionally blend social, 
environmental and economic value. Organizations operating in this middle 
ground of commercial and social enterprise (regardless of their legal status) have 
differing aspects of both social and commercial value creation. Id. at 4.
25 Christyne J. Vachon, Blurring. Not Fading. Looking at the Duties of Care and 
Loyalty as Nonprofits Move into Commercialism, 12 TENN. J. BUS. L. 37, 42-43
(2011). Mark Blodgett, Linda Melconian & Jason Peterson, State Oversight of
Nonprofit Governance: Confronting the Challenge of Mission Adherence Within 
A Multi-Dimensional Standard, 32  J. L. & COMM., 81, 108 (2013).Well-known 
and egregious scandals such as Enron and World-Com in the for-profit sector 
have resulted in enhanced Federal scrutiny and reform efforts culminating in 
Congress’ enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. Its purpose is to strengthen the standard of 
fiduciary duty by improving corporate governance through financial controls 
and audits for business corporations…Although Congress generally excluded 
nonprofits from SOX, many advocate that they should fall under or comply with 
the principles of SOX; albeit this challenge may be limited to nonprofits in the 
largest asset class.
Id. at n.109 (citing Mark Blodgett & Linda Melconian, Health-Care Nonprofits: 
Enhancing Governance And Public Trust, 117/2 BUS. & SOC. REV. 197, 201-
12(2012)).
26 Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance, and 
Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the 
Nonprofit Sector (June 2005), available at https://perma.cc/S5L6-RX55. Several 
newsworthy controversies led to the changes. See also Adelphi University v. 
Board of Regents of the State of New York, 229 A.D. 2d 36 (1997) (finding high 
salary of President indicated that Board failed to achieve its educational mission 
7
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philanthropy, shared value, regulation, and nonprofit ethical leadership 
initiatives (such as the Report to Congress), have all helped to strengthen 
stakeholder sustainability and corporate governance values. 
These efforts hold corporate directors to a higher standard of 
care, a public purpose standard, thus enhancing fiduciary governance in 
both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. Perhaps the development of 
social enterprise is an inevitable reaction to corporate malfeasance in 
both sectors and the controversies on Wall Street.27 It may prove to be a 
powerful catalyst for enhancing corporate ethical behavior. Such 
behavior complements the objectives of social enterprise as it expressly 
includes multiple stakeholders other than shareholders.28 Corporate 
philanthropic foundations are an important link in this ethical approach 
and many for-profit corporations create and fund nonprofit foundations.
III. CORPORATE FOUNDATIONS
Corporate Foundations are nonprofit entities that facilitate both 
CSR initiatives and philanthropy and are committed to ensuring a healthy 
community in reciprocity with their parent company.29 Several corporate 
foundations facilitate their CSR by contributing billions of dollars to 
“doing good,” and include such familiar parent company names as Coca-
Cola, Wal-Mart, Exxon, and Ford. 30 Corporate Foundations are driven 
by mission rather than profits through the collaboration with for-profits 
to obtain capital resources that support their social missions. “By tying 
corporate philanthropy to its business and strategy, a company can create 
even greater social value in improving grantee performance than other 
donors. Its specialized assets and expertise, after all, will be most useful 
                                                                                                                                  
and breached fiduciary duties);  Karen Donnelly, United Way, Good 
Governance: Has the IRS Usurped the Best Judgment of Tax Exempt 
Organizations in the Name of Transparency and Accountability, 79 UMKC L.
REV. 163, 173–74 (2010) (discussing nonprofit scandals including Aramony v. 
United Way involving excessive executive compensation, mismanagement, and 
misuse of organization’s donated funds); Keith Epstein, Case Study: American 
Red Cross, CONTRIBUTE (2009) (discussing Red Cross’s failure to disclose 
withholding of $200 million from 9/11 donations for administrative costs). See 
also Blodgett & Melconian, supra note 25.
27 Jamie Raskin, Plan B for Corporations, THE NATION, June 27, 2011, at 14. 
See also Miriam F. Weismann, Jason H. Peterson & Christopher A. Buscaglia, 
The New Macroprudential Reform Paradigm: Can It Work? 16 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 
1029 (2014).
28 David G. Mandelbaum, Corporate Sustainability Strategies, 26 TEMPLE J.
SCI., TECH. & ENV’T. L. 27 (2007).
8
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in addressing problems related to its particular field.”31 Such “context 
focused philanthropy” requires a different view of competition—one that 
focuses on core competencies and shared value.32 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, anecdotal evidence suggests “that firms will not 
substantially invest in corporate giving unless it adds economic value.”33
The Corporate Foundation continues to evolve as an effective 
form for sustaining philanthropic initiatives.34 It communicates 
commitment to CSR and creates a stakeholder reputation.35
Furthermore, parent companies access the Corporate Foundation form 
not only for image but also for good and effective governance.36 Aside 
from facilitating CSR and stakeholder dialogue, the Corporate 
Foundation can benefit the parent company by clarifying and 
strengthening core competencies and by establishing new markets and 
brands.37 “There is no inherent contradiction between improving 
competitive context and making a sincere commitment to bettering 
society.”38 Such views of corporate philanthropy signal the new fourth 
sector of social enterprise where the shared values of public purpose and 
profits are expressly blended in one form.
IV. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: BLENDED OBJECTIVES
Social enterprise takes on many roles; yet no single definition 
prevails.39 Currently it exists as a business model for social objectives 
                                                                                                                                  
29 Posting of What is Corporate Philanthropy?, http://truist.com/what-is-
corporate-philanthropy  (August 6, 2013) (on file with Authors).
30 Id.
31 See Porter, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
32 Id.
33 Baruch Lev, Christine Petrovits & Suresh Radhakrishnan, Is Doing Good 
Good for You? How Corporate Charitable Contributions Enhance Revenue 
Growth, 31 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 198 (2010).
34 The Evolving Role of Foundations in Corporate Philanthropy, (March 25, 
2013), TRUIST BLOG, https://perma.cc/87JV-67GE) (on file with Authors).
35 Martina Westhues & Sabine Einwiller, Corporate Foundations: Their Role for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 9 CORP. REPUTATION REV., 144, 149  (2006). 
36 See Evolving Role of Foundations supra note 34 and accompanying text. See 
also Lev et al., supra note 33, at 198.
37 See Westhues, supra note 35, at 148.
38 See Porter, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 16.
39 See Hans Rawhouser et al., Benefit Corporation Legislation and the 
Emergence of a Social Hybrid Category, 57 CAL. MGMT. REV. 13, 15 (2015).
(“These new legal forms do not alleviate all the tensions stemming from 
9
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and potentially suggests a new or fourth sector of the U.S. economy.40
Some herald it as a new era of entrepreneurial capitalism where for-
profits serve society.41  Furthermore, it embraces a stakeholder 
governance model that pursues both financial and non-financial return on 
investment.42 Thus, it rejects maximization of shareholder wealth as the 
sole driver of business decisions.43 For purposes of this article, the 
authors address the social enterprise entities of Benefit Corporations and 
L3Cs which exhibit both nonprofit mission and for-profit characteristics.
For example, a Benefit Corporation can “engage in any legitimate 
business activity” and “accept debt and equity investments” in addition
to pursuing its social objective.44 Such blended objectives are the 
hallmark of social enterprise.
Advocates view social enterprise as superior to traditional for-
profit and nonprofit entities because they perceive them as having greater 
                                                                                                                                  
organizational hybridity, but they do provide initial steps in the ongoing 
negotiation of a more widely accepted space for social hybrids.”) (Id.).
40 See Diane Holt & David Littlewood, Identifying, Mapping and Monitoring the 
Impact of Hybrid Firms, 57 CAL. MGMT. REV. 107 (2015) (juxtaposing social 
primacy requiring a shared value compared to shareholder primacy).
41 See Gregory Dees & Beth Battle Anderson, For-Profit Social Ventures, 2 
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 1 (2003); See Porter, supra note 23, at 98-104. 
42 Filipe Santos et al., Making Hybrids Work:  Aligning Business Models and 
Organizational Design for Social Enterprises, 57 CAL. MGMT. REV 36, 36-37
(2015). However, at some point, difficult decisions may emerge for which 
business leaders need to weigh the value capture for the company against value 
creation for society.  One approach is to treat these goals as a trade-off and make 
a choice between profit and societal impact, looking at societal demands as 
constraints on how the business should operate. Another approach is to treat 
these societal demands as signs of the future and fundamentally re-think the 
business model of the company---the way activities are organized and how
stakeholders are engaged—so that the trade-offs can potentially become win-
win situations. Developing innovative ways of doing business that align profit 
and societal impact is a key challenge for corporate leaders in the 21st century.
Id. at 36-37.
43 See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying 
Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 228-29 (2012).
44 Briana Cummings, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to 
Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUMBIA L. REV. 578, 579 n. 1 (2012) 
(quoting material from Alissa Mickels, Note, Beyond Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a For-Benefit Corporation with 
Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 271, 281 (2009)).
10
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sustainable impact on the environment and society.45   Social 
entrepreneurs begin with their desire to blend their profit-making and 
social missions in a single entity. They believe in the unique ability of 
social enterprise to solve social problems and return profits to owners as 
explicit blended governance values.46
Traditionally, nonprofits have engaged in profit-making 
commercial activities to help subsidize their charitable purposes; but 
these activities are generally incidental to their primary mission of social
benefit and are regulated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 47
Likewise, for-profit corporations, despite the recent trend towards 
creating social value, traditionally have engaged in CSR as incidental to 
their main stockholder profit-making purpose.48 However, social 
enterprise consists of expressly legislated governance values blended in 
one form in contrast to these dual forms of traditional for-profit and 
nonprofit entities. The following describes two prominent business 
entities of social enterprise, the Benefit Corporation and the L3C.
A. Benefit Corporation 
The B-Corp is a state-oriented legal status that is driven by its 
blended form of social mission and shareholder return. Among various 
social enterprise forms, it is the most similar to the traditional 
corporation because its legal structure is a standard corporate form; 
however, it is dissimilar because it requires both a general and specific 
public benefit.49 This combination allows the Board of Directors to 
make profit-sacrificing decisions.
B-Corps originated in Vermont in 2006; (since then?) more than 
30 states have enacted “stakeholder statutes” to create B-Corps that 
possess some unique advantages over traditional for-profit 
                                                          
45 See Santos supra note 42 and accompanying text.
46 Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.
REV. 681, 683-84 (2013)(emphasis added). 
47 Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 
VT. L REV. 1, 105 (2010).  It is becoming more challenging to distinguish 
between sector practices since the for-profit and nonprofit relationship is 
stronger than ever. Judith Bosscher, Commercialization in Nonprofits:  Tainted 
Value? 5 SPNA REV. 1 (2009).
48 John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”:  A 
Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 16 VT. L. REV. 117, 
132-37 (2010) (recognizing that state constituency statutes have not changed the 
traditional notions of fiduciary duties).
49 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A §§ 21.08(a)-(e) (2015). 
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corporations.50 Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream Corporation provides an 
example of a Vermont B-Corp whose owners prioritized social causes 
above profits.51 Moreover, these statutes require corporate Directors and 
Officers to consider non-shareholder interests as part of doing business.
This express authority to serve stakeholders is a key organizational and 
governance departure from traditional for-profit governance. It places 
stakeholders on at least equal footing with shareholders, thus deviating 
significantly from the doctrine of shareholder primacy.52   It provides B-
Corps with an apparent equal double bottom line thus “achieving and 
governing truly blended enterprise.”53  Consequently, these state statutes 
may insulate Directors from liability under the Business Judgment 
Rule.54 Additionally, the state statutes create a new private right of 
action for shareholders to enforce the public benefit mandate.55 While 
these requirements may attempt to provide effective public purpose 
governance tools, the ability to maintain that “delicate balance” between 
protections for Directors and shareholders is an inherent challenge of 
“consistently serving two masters.”56
Some obvious disadvantages exist for B-Corps. A major 
challenge for B-Corps is attracting investors for lower returns since they 
discard shareholder primacy.57 Moreover, B-Corps cannot apply for the 
federal 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status on income which nonprofits enjoy.58
                                                          
50 Tit. 11A §§ 21.08(a)-(e) (2015).  For example, B-Corps must meet statutory 
requirements that include purpose, accountability and transparency. Id.
51 See Schoenjahn, supra note 3, at 490. 
52 See Holt & Littlewood supra note 40 and accompanying text.
53 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 47, at 105.
54 See Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of 
How the Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in 
Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 635-39(2007). 
55 Tit. 11A §§ 21.08(a)-(e) (2015). See also Santos, supra note 42, at 36. [There 
is a] debate taking place with regard to the potential for creating a new ‘hybrid’ 
legal structure which would be neither for-profit nor nonprofit, but have aspects 
of each.Such a structure, sometimes called a ‘for-benefit’ organization, would 
have the benefit of providing clarity for investors and enabling the development 
of new financial instruments.
Id. at 36-37.
56 See Schoenjahn, supra note 3; see also Kerr, supra note 54.
57 Id.
58 L3Cs and B Corporations: Blurring the Line Between Nonprofits and For-
Profits, L’ECONOMIE, July 17, 2013, available at http://www.economie-
avenir.com/entrepreneuriat-social/l3cs-and-b-corporations-blurring-the-line-
between-nonprofits-and-for-profits. Unlike these nonprofit entities, however, B-
Corps do not face the same restrictions on fundraising.
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A nonprofit cannot become a B-Corp; however, it may create a B-Corp 
as a vehicle for conducting and scaling the earned income or activities of 
the nonprofit.59 Additionally, no clarification exists of priority or 
emphasis between the general and specific public purpose benefits. Also, 
their public purpose mandate requires accountability and transparency 
through certification from a non-governmental, independent nonprofit 
(B-lab), which gives a certified B-Corp “a high standard of overall social 
and environmental performance.”60 Not in the source “B Corp 
Certification is the next chapter for socially responsible businesses.”61
Currently, state statutes do not require B-lab certification or provide any 
identifiable state oversight of the certification process. The state requires 
only a modest requirement of disclosure through annual reports.62
The L3C is a low-profit limited liability business model for 
charitable education purposes.63 It originated in Vermont in 2008 two 
years after Vermont adopted the B-Corp statute. The L3C must meet 
three requirements: 1) “significantly” pursue a charitable educational 
purpose, 2) not “significantly” pursue profits and 3) have no political 
purpose.64 Thus in significantly pursuing a charitable or social mission, 
L3Cs operate like nonprofits. However, while these entities place 
mission before significant profits, they still attract investors and not 
charitable donors. This is in stark contrast to the traditional nonprofit 
model where mission adherence and donor support for accomplishment 
of mission are paramount.65
Since 2008, at least nine states have created L3Cs which have 
unique and conflicting advantages and disadvantages. Since L3Cs have 
equity owners rather than shareholders, one perceived advantage is that 
they can generate revenues and offer financial returns to their equity 
owners. However, a potential disadvantage in providing these returns is 
possible competition with traditional nonprofits for foundation dollars.66
Another perceived advantage is the state requirement that L3Cs pursue 
                                                          
59 See Schoenjahn, supra note 3, at 490.
60 B Lab, Why B Corps Matter, available at http://www.bcorporation.net/what-
are-b-corps/why-b-corps-matter.
61 Ben and Jerry’s, About Us, https://perma.cc/D2D4-W2LG.
62 Certification occurs through B-lab, which has certified over 1000 B corps 
operating through 60 industries in 30 countries. Currently, no state oversight of 
the B-lab certification process exists.  Annual Report B Lab, 2014, available at
https://perma.cc/Y6K6-8668.
63 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A § 3001 (27)(A)(i) (2015).
64 Id.
65 See Blodgett et al., supra note 25 (noting nonprofits cannot become L3Cs).
66 See Schoenjahn, supra note 3.
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significant social purpose rather than the less significant purpose of 
generating profits. Thus, parties who invest in L3Cs knowingly assume 
the risk of its social purpose as paramount to profits.67 Moreover, since 
no Federal tax exists on any profits generated by an L3C, its profitability 
is not regulated.68 Consequently, this blended objective could result in a 
serious disadvantage of tax evasion and jeopardize the tax consequences 
of other investors, particularly the nonprofit foundation and its own 
social mission purpose.69
Another conflicting, yet perhaps more significant advantage, is 
the statutory intent that L3Cs be recipients of the unique “Program 
Related Investment” (PRI) recipients; thus, attracting foundations and 
other investors. PRIs are the main financial tool used by nonprofit 
charitable foundations to make high risk investments of billions of 
dollars to IRS qualified PRI recipient-organizations. In 1972, Congress 
created a tax exception for PRIs. This Federal IRS tax exemption 
provides flexibility to a nonprofit tax-exempt foundation to make 
funding investments to for-profit companies whose program activities 
help the foundation accomplish its social mission.70 This flexibility 
enables private foundations to offer “loans or investments . . . . for 
charitable or education projects,” despite the fact that for-profit entities 
exercise control over funding and accomplishment of these public 
purpose projects.71 Furthermore, this permissive flexibility in the 
foundation’s use of PRI loans and investments creates “an exception to 
the general rule that foundations can invest only in nonprofits.”72  While 
L3Cs were created to enjoy these advantages, certain ambiguities create 
disadvantages, as L3Cs do not yet qualify for PRI recipient designation 
from the IRS. Thus, they can pursue social good, but without regulatory 
guidance or express IRS directives.
This summary of two prominent social enterprise entities 
reflects a fresh concept of doing business. Social enterprise is winning 
enthusiastic and passionate adherents, and some advocates perceive these 
                                                          
67 Id.
68 But see Santos, supra note 42, at 36 (“[G]overnmental regulations, policies, 
and tax code have a significant (perhaps primary) effect upon the degree to 
which market forces are allowed to work to create blended value.”)
69 Id.
70 Michael D. Gottesman, From Cobblestones to Pavement:  The Legal Road 
Forward for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POLICY 
REV. 345, 348-49 (2007). See also Reiser, supra note 46, at682. 
71 See L’Economie, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
72 See Pearce, supra note 9, at 270.
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dynamic and robust entities as filling a gap in traditional capitalism. Yet, 
the regulatory and ethical environment will require legislative 
clarification and regulatory guidance for more effective governance.73
Blended objectives create concerns; however, we must recall that 
Congress initiated The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Nonprofit Report to 
Congress not only to address malfeasance and impropriety, but also to 
instill more effective and sustainable traditional for-profit and nonprofit 
corporate governance through ethical leadership--integrity beyond 
compliance.74 Similar legislative and best practices are in order to sustain 
the future of social enterprise.
V. ANALYSIS
Attaining a shared value fiduciary governance standard is 
realistic since shared value is not a new concept. A brief review of the 
governance values of for profits and their nonprofit corporate 
foundations illustrates this concept. A sample of the top fifty Fortune 500 
corporations reveals that 62% (31) articulate CSR, philanthropy, and 
shared value. Further, sixty-six percent have philanthropic foundations.
Corporations articulate shared value that emphasizes core competencies 
and public purpose. They may also include statements of initiatives that 
include philanthropic CSR. A selection of fifteen Fortune 500 
corporations, through their non-profit philanthropic foundations, reveals 
that 100% (15) of the nonprofit philanthropic foundations articulate 
shared value.
                                                          
73 See Porter, supra note 23 and accompanying text. at 98-104; Sabeti, supra
note 7 and accompanying text; see also Reiser, supra note 46 and accompanying 
text.
74 Linda K. Trevino, Michael Brown & Laura P. Hartman, A Qualitative 
Investigation of Perceived Executive Ethical Leadership: Perceptions From 
Inside and Outside the Executive Suite, 56 HUMAN RELATIONS 5, 19 (2003).
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Table A
Sector Governance Values 






















*62% (or 31) of the top 50 Fortune 500 Companies engage in CSR, 
Philanthropy & Shared Value
*66% (or 33) of the same sample have Corporate Philanthropic 
Nonprofit Foundations
A further examination of the examples of corporate shared value 
statements as expressed through corporate philanthropic foundations is 
illustrative. Whether the priority is profits or social benefit, these 
examples manifest shared value.
Table B
Corporate Expressions of CSR, Philanthropy, and Shared 
Value
“We also invest in efforts to improve disaster preparedness in 
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communities. Walmart and the Walmart Foundation work together in 
complementary ways to contribute business and philanthropic assets to 
the field, including logistics and operations expertise, use of physical 
assets such as buildings and trucks, and cash and in-kind donations.”75
“We support a range of programs that allow community partners to test, 
deliver and scale innovative approaches that provide consumers with the 
tools and support they need to achieve their financial goals, transforming 
financial knowledge into effective action. These investments, including 
financial coaching and counseling programs, enable consumers to 
implement financial plans, make payments, increase their savings, reduce 
debt and build their credit.”76
“Freddie Mac strongly supports the benefit of credit education and 
building sound financial literacy skills among consumers. Well-informed 
and well-prepared homebuyers are on the best path to enjoying 
successful and sustainable homeownership.”77
“Nonprofit organizations that focus on providing affordable housing are 
partnered with local Home Depot stores to receive donated materials.
The nonprofits then use those products to repair, refurbish, and rebuild 
nearby homes and facilities benefitting deserving families and 
individuals.”78
“Microsoft is proud to work with more than 50,000 nonprofits around the 
world every year to provide them with affordable access to the 
technology they need to support their work in local communities, and to 
leverage technology to help them be more efficient, effective and 
innovative in doing their important work. Whether it is through our 
software donations, technology solutions for nonprofit problems, or 
Office 365 for Nonprofits, we strive to help nonprofits do more good.”79
                                                          
75 Walmart Community Giving, “Special Interests,” https://perma.cc/5CJ3-
9LU5.
76 Citi Foundation, Our Strategy, https://perma.cc/8AJX-H8M4.
77 Freddie Mac, “CreditSmart®,” https://perma.cc/4XWK-HSFN.
78 Home Depot, “Framing Hope, a Material Difference,” https://perma.cc/FE9J-
Q4JB (last visited April 22, 2016).
79 World Vision, “World Vision will benefit from Microsoft software donation 
to impact more than 2 million in Latin America,” https://perma.cc/DY79-DZNE 
(last visited April 22, 2016).
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While social enterprise has often been portrayed as an overly 
optimistic attempt at revising capitalism for societal purposes,80 shared 
value now appears to be a corporate governance norm as the traditional 
for-profit sector also asserts shared value applications. In fact, a for-
profit may have a B-Corp for a subsidiary, such as Ben & Jerry’s.81
Thus, the for-profit sector currently reinforces B-Corp objectives with 
statements of shared value that reaffirm public purpose governance. 
Among traditional corporations, their nonprofit philanthropic 
foundations, and the newly created social enterprise entities that earn 
profits and benefit society, all affirm public purpose governance.
However, within social enterprise, the B-Corp and the L3C accomplish 
this objective with express legislative intent; while in the traditional for-
profit and nonprofit sectors, these activities cause a blurring within these 
sectors --beyond the scope of their primary business or social objectives.
“The blurring of the boundary between successful for-profits and 
nonprofits is one of the strong signs that creating shared value is 
possible.”82 This blurring accommodates public purpose in for-profits 
and commercial activities within nonprofits, yet maintains the separate 
boundaries of their respective legal forms. In contrast, the new social 
enterprise has blended objectives and unresolved fiduciary duties that 
call for a resolution. We propose a shared value “adaptation” as an 
evolving fiduciary standard.83 Perhaps social enterprise is an outgrowth 
                                                          
80 Surowiecki, 
supra note 14 (“It’s easy to be skeptical of the mushy rhetoric surrounding B 
corps. Yet the desire to balance profit and purpose is arguably a return to the 
model that many American companies once followed.”).
81 See Interview by Rob Michalek, They’re a B-Corp? Ben & Jerry’s, available 
at https://perma.cc/D2GZ-KBD4. In 1988, Ben & Jerry’s was one of the first 
companies in the world to place a social mission in equal importance to its 
product and economic missions. Since then, the movement has grown and now 
has a unifying set of principles and criteria on which to evaluate socially 
responsible businesses. It’s called the “B Corp” movement (or Benefit 
Corporation movement). Certified B Corps satisfy a rigorous set of standards to 
achieve certification. True to our pioneering spirit, we became the first-ever 
wholly-owned subsidiary to gain B Corp Certification.
Ben and Jerry’s Joins the B-Corp Movement, BEN & JERRY’S, 
https://perma.cc/67U9-79LB.
82 Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Values: How to 
Reinvent Capitalism-and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. 
BUS. REV. 1, 7 (2011).
83 See Tyler, supra note 48, at 118 (“recognizing that the L3C is a hybrid and 
that its conceptions of fiduciary duty evolve from more traditional forms”).
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of this blurring phenomenon where public purpose governance values are 
reaffirmed as fundamental to doing business.
The overall sustainability of the B-Corp and L3C must be the 
next concern for social enterprise. The federal government, through the 
IRS, is limited to regulating the tax consequences of these entities.
Therefore, primary regulation of B-Corps and L3Cs is reserved to the 
states that created them. We propose five recommendations for 
improving the governance of social enterprise within this federal-state 
regulatory framework.
VI. FIVE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Designate L3Cs as Qualified PRI Recipients 
One obvious disadvantage, in the absence of PRI recipient 
designation, is that foundations may view L3Cs as less attractive 
investment opportunities than traditional nonprofits.84 Furthermore, 
foundation assumption of L3C investment risks appears to be a pre-
requisite to encourage other investors to pursue L3C investments. Yet, 
too much uncertainty exists for potential L3C investors without clear and 
effective federal or state regulation. For example, state statutes permit 
wide discretion for the Directors of L3Cs to choose social good; yet, they 
provide no general guidance or specific qualitative or quantitative
standards to determine the extent to which the pursuit of social good over 
business purpose is allowable. The only state limits on profits are the 
ambiguous standard of “something less than significant.”85 Likewise, 
there is no IRS prioritization between pursuing profit and pursuing public 
purpose.
Congress must enact legislation or the IRS must promulgate 
regulations which permit L3Cs to be designated as qualified “Program 
Related Investment” (PRI) recipients. Such designation would alleviate 
the risk of nonprofit foundations facing tax consequences or penalties for 
making investments and loans to an L3C. Since the L3C is a new entity, 
it requires clarification of its current ambiguous PRI recipient status.86
                                                          
84 See Schoenjahn, supra note 3.
85Tit. 11A § 3001 (27)(A)(i) (2015).
86 See L3C Part 2: Defining Characteristics of An L3C available at
https://perma.cc/K4UX-6F4W (last visited August 2, 2010) The double bottom 
line of social mission and financial returns could increases access to funding not 
necessarily available to social entrepreneurs especially the broader and highly 
attractive PRI investments. Id. However, the IRS, as the federal taxpayers’ 
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Legislative proposals to accomplish this purpose were pending in the 
113th Congress, but failed when the Congressional term expired.87
However, the IRS possesses the power to issue a ruling immediately, at 
the request of either an individual foundation or an L3C, to determine 
whether an investment qualifies as a PRI. As of this writing, the IRS is 
still undergoing a process to determine the tax consequences of 
foundation investments in L3Cs and whether or not L3Cs qualify as PRI 
recipients. These state statutes provide the essential requirement for 
L3C’s to receive PRI investments. However, foundations which are 
financially courted by L3Cs assume too much risk and potential adverse 
tax consequences absent a qualified PRI recipient ruling. The IRS needs 
to promulgate rulings that reduce these ambiguities and designate L3Cs 
as qualified PRI recipients.
B. Require State Attorney General Oversight of Social 
Enterprise
State attorneys general already bear the responsibility to provide 
oversight, enforcement and accountability of both nonprofits and for-
profit entities. One missing ingredient is state authority over the B-lab 
certification process of B-Corps. There is an obvious disconnect between 
the B-lab certification and the Secretary of State’s certification. The state 
attorneys general must exercise oversight over the B-Corp certification 
process and require additional protections to help promote investor 
confidence in the business success of these blended entities. Currently, 
only a modest disclosure requirement exists through annual reports of the 
general public benefits without any formal state attorney general 
oversight of the certification process. These annual reports must be filed 
with the attorney general in the states where stakeholder statutes have 
                                                                                                                                  
watchdog agency has not provided formal notification that L3Cs will receive 
any preferential designation as presumptive PRI qualified organizations.  Id.
87 The Program-Related Investment Promotion Act of 2008, available at
http://www.charitableplanning.com/cpc_1818089-1.pdf; Philanthrophic 
Facilitation Act, H.R. 2832 (Introduced July 25, 2013). The most promising 
appears to be the Philanthropic Facilitation Act of 2010 (PFA), which proposes 
a voluntary procedure similar to the process for recognizing 501(3) tax-exempt 
organization.  Id. Either one of the entities, the foundation or L3C, could ask the 
IRS for a ruling on whether or not an investment qualifies as a PRI. Id. New 
2012 IRS Proposed Guidelines have emerged which provide nine examples of 
qualified PRI recipients.Id. However, these guidelines do not modify 
appropriately the existing regulations that control PRI’s to include L3Cs. Id.
Therefore, no automatic PRI recipient status for L3Cs yet exists. Id.
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been adopted. Furthermore, the Attorney General’s office should adopt 
regulatory standards of measurements by which to accept or reject the B-
Corp certification process. Finally, the attorney general, in fulfilling the 
state oversight responsibility, may require more detailed disclosure on 
the specific public purpose as well. State legislatures should require state 
attorneys general oversight of social enterprise entities.
C. Reduce State Statutory Ambiguities
States must resolve the ambiguous statutory language of “not 
significant” profits and use of tranche investing opportunities to sustain 
L3Cs. The current statutory language is subject to problems of 
interpretation and provides no specific protection to multiple and multi-
tiered L3C investors. For example, the current state statutory flexibility 
enables L3Cs to use different rates of return for different investors thus 
allowing for a multi-tiered investment strategy known as tranche 
investing. Generally, this kind of investment can spread the risk and 
provide better return for investors more interested in the financial return 
than in the social benefits created. However, for L3Cs, the ambiguous 
“not significant” profits language in the state stakeholder statutes 
restricts this opportunity. No objective qualitative or quantitative 
standard yet exists to qualify the “not significant” language.88 Such a
subjective standard could create misunderstandings among multi-tiered 
investors and the L3C.89 The states must reduce these statutory 
ambiguities. 
D. Adopt SOX-like Ethical Principles of Transparency, 
Disclosure, Accountability
Both L3Cs and B-Corps should adopt timely disclosure of 
financial statements to investors and the public with SOX-like principles 
and best practices on financial reporting and auditing. These entities may 
be deficient in an ethical culture without a code of ethics as required by 
                                                          
88 Tit.11A § 3001 (27)(A)(i) (2015).
89 Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by 
Proxy or Perversion? 63 ARK. L. REV. 245, 251 (2010). Perhaps investors L3Cs 
would be more sustainable if they focused on broader funding sources.  Id. They 
could attract investors from for-profits who invest for more return and those 
from other nonprofits who invest for a social return, especially those who find 
PRI investments too risky. Id. However, this quest for broader funding sources 
creates competition with traditional for-profits and nonprofits. Id.
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SOX. Furthermore, L3Cs face a potential ethical dilemma of receiving 
nonprofit tax benefits from PRI investments while they pursue for-profit 
commercialization. Such lack of ethical governance could create 
inappropriate competition with traditional for-profit and nonprofit 
entities. These state stakeholder statutes must authorize the attorney 
general the ability to hold these social enterprise entities accountable for 
financial disclosure statements and audits. Some states, including 
Vermont, are beginning to provide this monitoring.90   The provisions of 
SOX, enacted by the Congress in response to the serious for-profit 
ethical breaches of the 1990’s, require strict for-profit corporate 
compliance on financial matters. Likewise, many large nonprofits, 
though generally not covered by its provisions, have adopted SOX-like 
principles in light of recent nonprofit ethical scandals.91 Although 
greater financial disclosure requires more regulation, it builds public and 
investor confidence in these social enterprise entities. 
E. Establish and Clarify Fiduciary Duty as Shared Value for 
Both a Corporate Governance and Legislative Standard
State created social enterprises such as B-Corps and L3Cs 
mandate social objectives as well as profits---one form with blended 
governance values. They can even allow investors to emphasize social 
mission, not profits, and to be supported in that social mission by 
foundation grants.92 However, these new entities appear to obfuscate 
fiduciary duty distinctions without any regulatory guidance or well-
established legal precedent.93 These entities of blended objectives 
present fiduciary governance conflicts which require immediate attention 
in order to achieve their full potential of public purpose governance.
Therefore, a legislatively created balance of governance values is 
necessary; one that is rooted in shared value.
State legislatures should authorize attorneys general the power to 
implement new governance norms. Currently, it is unclear as to what 
                                                          
90 See Pearce, supra note 9, at 270.
91 Mark Blodgett & L. Melconian, Health-care Nonprofits:  Enhancing 
Governance and Public Trust, 117 BUS & SOC. REV. 197 (2012). 
92 Stephanie Strom, Hybrid Model for Nonprofits Hits Snags, NEW YORK TIMES,
Oct. 25, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/business/26hybrid.html?pagewanted=all.
93 See also Reiser, supra note 46.See Pearce, supra note 9, at 279. The fiduciary 
duties owed are not clear in L3Cs.
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fiduciary duties apply to B-Corps and L3Cs. Traditional connotations of 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty for both for-profits and nonprofits, 
and the additional nonprofit duty of obedience to mission, may be 
irrelevant or unsuited to apparent conflicts of interest in these social 
enterprise entities. For example, stakeholder statutes provide the B-Corp 
with an equal double bottom line creating the appearance of a 
governance standard that consistently serves two masters. They also 
create the L3C entity subject to ambiguous requirements to 
“significantly” pursue a charitable educational purpose and “not 
significantly” to pursue profits. Thus L3Cs operate like nonprofits in 
significantly pursuing a charitable or social mission. However, while 
they place mission before significant profits, they still attract investors 
and not charitable donors. Perhaps one way to avoid this conflict is to 
require specific fiduciary duty language in their governance that clearly 
identifies social and profit objectives. The language should expressly 
state a fiduciary responsibility that carefully balances social mission and 
financial returns to investors. In other words, a fiduciary standard that 
expressly articulates a duty of shared value.94 This would provide 
investors with standard L3C fiduciary responsibility. State legislatures 
should clarify fiduciary norms for social enterprise governance. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Social enterprise strives to accomplish both social and business 
objectives. It is a bold and new way of doing business that requires 
shared value. Yet, its continued success will necessitate careful 
legislative attention to potential conflicts of interest inherent in blended 
social and business objectives. Consistent with the spirit and substance of 
legislative reforms and ethical initiatives for traditional for-profits and 
nonprofits, social enterprise should also create an appropriate ethical 
balance of governance norms with a fiduciary standard of shared value.
Social enterprise can strengthen its blended and shared objectives 
through proposals that envision broad and dynamic public purpose
governance within a new and express corporate form.
                                                          
94 Matthew Lee & Jason Jay, Strategic Responses to Hybrid Social Ventures, 57
CAL. MGMT. REV. 126, 129 (2015) (discussing relevance of sustainability as a 
result of hybrid social ventures). 
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The enthusiastic response of social enterprise and its blended 
objectives can hardly be in error, since shared value is also found across 
the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. The success of shared value
initiatives across sectors demonstrates the validity of social enterprise’s 
fundamental approach. Now is the time to assert ethical leadership for 
what may emerge formally as “the fourth sector” of our economy, a 
sector that reaffirms public purpose governance through shared value.
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